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ABSTRACT: In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the United
States Supreme Court established the premier categorical regulatory takings
standard with certain limited exceptions. The Lucas rule establishes that
private property owners are entitled to compensation for a taking under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when a government regulation "denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land." Today, Lucas remains the
controlling law on categorical regulatory takings. But in application, how
much does Lucas still matter?
In reviewing more than 1,700 cases in state and federal courts, we identified
that Lucas claims were successful in just 1.6% of the cases. This does not
mean Lucas is unimportant, however. The small Lucas claim success rate
suggests the importance of being strategic in pleading takings claims. The
problem of defining the denominator in the regulatory takings equation is
essential to understand for litigants pursuing the Lucas categorical
regulatory takings analysis. Based upon our research, we argue that Lucas's
holding incentivizes the private contractual agreements entered into by
property owners to shrink the takings denominator and tilt the scales slightly
in favor of the plaintiff The ability of a property owner to reduce the
denominator remains the loadstar for a Lucas case-winning strategy.
This is important for not only theorists but also for practitioners to know as
they litigate and conduct transactions in Lucas's shadow.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court established
the premier categorical regulatory takings standard with certain limited
exceptions.' The Lucas rule establishes that private property owners are
entitled to compensation for a taking under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause when a government "regulation denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land."2 The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause states that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."3 In determining whether the regulation at issue meets this
1. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2. Id.at1015.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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standard, courts have traditionally used an "economic value fraction."4 The
numerator is the diminution in value of the private property attributable to
the impact of the government regulation.5 The denominator is the entirety of
the owner's rights in the "parcel as a whole."6 For a Lucas categorical taking,
the denominator must be at least virtually equal to the numerator such that
there is a deprivation of "all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."7 As a result, property owners seek to characterize their property rights
narrowly for as small a denominator as possible.8 The smaller the
denominator, the more likely it is to be equal to the numerator. On the other
hand, government regulators seek to characterize the property owner's
property rights broadly for as large a denominator as possible.9 This creates a
denominator that is much larger than the numerator signaling that the land
still has economic benefit to the property owner.
Today, Lucas remains the controlling law on categorical regulatory
takings."' But in application, how much does Lucas matter? Our review of
more than 1,700 cases in state and federal courts reveals only 27 cases in 25
years in which courts found a categorical taking under Lucas." By percentage,
4. Walcekv. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 261-62 (2001), af'd, 303 F.3 d 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
5. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States (Lost Tree CFC Il), 115 Fed. Cl. 219, 258, 262
(2014), affd, 787 F-3 d iii 1 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at io16 n.7 ("Regrettably,
the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its
precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value
is to be measured.").
6. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); see also Lucas,
505 U.S. at ioi6 n.7 (describing "the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be
measured"). For a discussion on the Penn Central test, see infra Part IV.
7. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 5o5 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 6o6, 631 (2001) (stating in the context of the Lucas total-takings analysis that
"[a]ssuming a taking is otherwise established, a State may not evade the duty to compensate on
the premise that the landowner is left with a token interest"); Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 787 F.3 d at 11 13(finding that a taking resulted from 99.4% diminishment in value in claimant's land and
"affirm[ing] that a Lucas taking occurred because the government's permit denial eliminated all
value stemming from Plat 57's possible economic uses").
8. DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: DEFENDING TAKINGS
CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 170 (2000).
9. See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in
the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 188 (2004) ("[W]hen the
numerator is a small toothpick and the denominator is the entire bundle, the likelihood of the
Court requiring compensation is small. Where the numerator is a large portion of the bundle, or
cuts across every stick in the bundle, the likelihood of compensation increases until it becomes
mandatory if certain core sticks or the entire bundle is taken.").
1o. Wendie L. Kellington, New Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, LAND USE L.,
http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/takings-update.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2017).
11. These 1,700 cases represent all cases available in the two major online databases (Lexis
Advance and WestlawNext) that cited Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), through March 23, 2017. A total of 1,8o8 cases were drawn from a Lexis Shepard's report
and i,713 cases were drawn from a Westlaw Keycite report. Compare Citing References for Lucas v.
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that works out to a Lucas-claim success rate ofjust 1.6%. This does not mean
Lucas is unimportant, however. Rather, the paucity of successful Lucas claims
itself tells a significant story about the importance of pleading takings claims.
We contend that Lucas's most enduring value is not its contribution to
the positive law but rather its effect on how litigants shape their cases. A
crucial aspect of the Lucas categorical regulatory takings analysis has been,
and will continue to be, the problem of defining the denominator in the
regulatory takings equation. Our research suggests that Lucas's holding
incentivizes the private contractual agreements entered into by property
owners to shrink the takings denominator and tilt the scales slightly in favor
of the plaintiff. The ability of a property owner to reduce the denominator
remains the lodestar for a Lucas case-winning strategy.- Whether this is good
or bad is a question we leave for another day. Our focus here is identifying
the components of a successful Lucas claim and the implications of our
findings for those who practice in this area. The Lucas rule, and how its many
contours play out on the ground, is important for not only theorists but also
for practitioners-those who litigate and conduct transactions in Lucas' s
shadow.
The discussion proceeds as follows: Part II explores the intricacies of the
Lucas decision and the guidance that emerges; Part III presents our empirical
data, grouping the Lucas winners into the following categories: nuisance
abatement cases, private agreements and the denominator, pyramidal
segmentation, and delay theory; Part IV discusses lessons learned and the
implications for practitioners, judges, government actors, and scholars. In the
end, Lucas still matters, just not for the reasons we most tend to think.
II. TAKINGS CLAIMS A LA LucAs
Understanding Lucas's holding means understanding the categorical
rule it announced, the exceptions to that rule, the denominator question, and
parcel as a whole. We start withJustice Scalia's majority decision. We then turn
to the opinions of the otherJustices in the case and their prediction about the
ambiguities created by the Lucas decision.
A. LucAs AND IT HOLDING
In 1986, David Lucas, a South Carolina real-estate developer, purchased
two lots in one of his residential subdivisions located in South Carolina on the
Isle of Palms.ls He planned to construct single-family homes on the lots;
however, his plans were interrupted when, in 1988, the South Carolina
Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act ("the Act"), which
S.C. Coastal Council, LEXIS ADVANCE (last visited Mar. 23, 2017), with CitingReferences for Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, WESTLAW (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
12. See infta Part I.D.3.
13. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1oo6-o8 (1992).
1850 [V01. 102:1847
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prohibited Lucas from placing "any permanent habitable structures" on the
lots.'4 Initially, the Act did not allow for any exceptions. 5
Lucas sued, alleging that the Act's prohibition was a permanent,
compensable taking of his private property.' 6 The South Carolina state trial
court agreed and ruled that the Act's prohibition on construction of any
permanent structure left the lots "valueless" and therefore constituted a total
permanent taking of his property.7 The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed.' 8 Important to the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision was
Lucas's concession that the Act was valid and proper in its design to preserve
the beaches in South Carolina, a public resource.9 The South Carolina
Supreme Court held that when the State regulates to prevent uses of property
that would otherwise result in serious harm to the public, the State has no
duty to pay compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, regardless of the severity of the effect of the
regulation on the value of the private property.2 o
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
South Carolina Supreme Court. In a 6-2 decision, the Court relied upon the
South Carolina trial court's determination that Lucas's lots had been
rendered valueless.21 In the process, the Court established two pivotal points
of law in the jurisprudence of takings and fomented additional ambiguities
about a third: (1) the categorical regulatory takings rule;22 (2) the exceptions
to the categorical rule-nuisance and background principles defenses;23 and
(3) the denominator question.24 The discussion now turns to these points.
B. THE CATEGORICAL REGULATORY TAKINGS RuLE
The Supreme Court in Lucas articulated a categorical regulatory takings
rule: Private property owners were entitled to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause when a government "regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land."25 Anything less than a total
deprivation would be analyzed under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City three-part balancing test-a test that considered the regulation's
economic impact, the extent of the regulation's interference with the
14. Id. at 1007.
15. Id. at lolo-13.
16. Id. at loog.
17. Id.
18. Id.
ig. Id. at loo9-lo.
20. Id. at iolo.
21. Id. at loso.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part I.B.1.
24. See infra Part II.B.2-H.C.
25. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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property owner's "distinct investment-backed expectations," and the
"character of the governmental action"-which is highly deferential to
government decision-making.26 Under Lucas, the Penn Central sort of
balancing is unnecessary because Lucas established a categorical takings rule,
and that is the benefit of Lucas. It is a one-part objective analysis: If no
"economically beneficial or productive use of land" is left, then compensation
is due.27
1. The Nuisance and Background Principles Defenses
Lucas held that the categorical regulatory takings rule was subject to two
exceptions. Both are inherent in the Supreme Court's admonition that " [a] ny
limitation so severe" that it deprives a private property owner of "all
economically beneficial use" of the owner's property and "cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."28 The first Lucas
exception is that government regulation is not a taking if the proposed use is
contrary to traditional, long-established limitations on private property rights
(the "background principles" exception).29 The second Lucas exception is
that a government regulation is not a taking, regardless of its impact, when
the government regulates to prevent uses that otherwise would have been
prohibited under the traditional law of nuisance (the "nuisance"
exception).so Thus, the government can avoid paying compensation if it can
prove that "the proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner's] title to
begin with."31
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cautioned the South Carolina
legislature that it could not create, through legislation, a new nuisance that
would undermine long-established private property rights.32 To hold
26. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
27. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
28. Id. at 1029; see MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE
CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 187-88 (1999) (indicating that only the traditional
principles of nuisance constitute an exception to Lucas); Carol Necole Brown, The Categorical
Lucas Rule and the Nuisance and Background Principles Exception, 3o TOURO L. REV. 349, 359-70
(2014) (discussing the nuisance exception to the Lucas categorical rule and successful statutory
nuisance abatement cases); David L. Callies & David A. Robyak, The Categorical (Lucas) Rule:
"Background Principles, "Per Se Regulatory Takings, and the State of Exceptions, 3o TOURO L. REV. 371,
379-80, 383 (2014) (discussing select cases in which the nuisance exception was successfully
applied to defeat the Lucas challenge).
29. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; MELTZ ETAL., supra note 28, at 168.
30. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28; Brown, supra note 28, at 359.
31. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; see generally Callies & Robyak, supra note 28 (articulating
categories of background principle defenses and surveying cases).
32. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 ("We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory
regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: Any limitation
so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the
1852 [Vol. io2:i847
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otherwise would compromise the limitations the Court had earlier placed on
exercises of the police power without compensation.33 With that, the Supreme
Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the Act was
consistent with background principles of South Carolina state law of property
and nuisance (and therefore took no property interest), something the Court
suggested was "unlikely."34
2. The Denominator Question
The denominator question asks: What is the relevant private property
interest against which the regulatory impact will be measured?35 One feature
of Lucas is that the denominator is essential to the categorical takings claim
yet the Lucas Court does not provide much guidance.36 The Court
acknowledges that the denominator calculation raises a "difficult question"
and that there have been "inconsistent pronouncements" because of
"uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator."37 Noticeably,
the Court declined to offer any guidance on how predictably to determine
the denominator in the regulatory takings analysis. This is true despite the
Court's acknowledgment of the centrality of the denominator problem.
Justice Scalia does not raise the denominator issue as a central concern
because the Court was constrained to accept the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas' determination that the South Carolina regulation rendered
Lucas's lots valueless.38 Justice Scalia addresses it in dictum, as does Justice
Blackmun in his dissent39 To the Justices' responses to Justice Scalia's
majority opinion, we turn next.
C. COMPIJCATING THE PICTURE: THEDISSENTNG AND SEPARATE OPINIONS
Justice Scalia's majority opinion has been the subject of considerable
judicial and scholarly commentary over the years. The majority opinion
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by
adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally, or otherwise.").
33. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S 393, 413 (1922)).
34. Id. at 1031-32.
35. For a recent decision that portends to challenge Penn Central as a seminal decision on
the point of the relevant denominator see generally Lost Tree Village. Corp. v. United States, 787
F. 3 d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (refusing to extend the parcel-as-a-whole analysis to include
developer's disparate real-estate holdings in the denominator).
36. Lucas, 505 U.S. at io16 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured.").
37. Id. at 1017 n7.
38. Id.
39. Id.; id. at 1054-55 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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elicited a separate concurrence by Justice Kennedy, separate dissenting
opinions by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, and a separate statement by
Justice Souter.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens criticized the majority's nuisance
exception as limiting it to common-law nuisance and rejecting the application
of statutory nuisance.4oJustice Blackmun rejected any common-law limitation
on the State's authority to regulate, without compensation, under the
nuisance doctrine. He argued that common-law courts frequently rejected
such a limited understanding of the State's power and that the Takings Clause
imposes no such limitation.1 He rejected the majority's narrowing of the
nuisance doctrine in takings jurisprudence and instead relied upon
precedent that recognizes the authority "for the legislature to interpose, and
by positive enactment to prohibit a use of property which would be injurious
to the public."41 Justice Blackmun also said that Lucas had not been deprived
of all economic value in his lots because he retained the right of alienation
and the lots "would have value for neighbors and for those prepared to enjoy
proximity to the ocean without a house."43
Justice Stevens questioned the majority opinion given the elasticity of the
concept of private property rights and the rational strategy of owners to
manipulate the nature of their property interest-the denominator, post-
Lucas-to improve the odds of a Lucas takings challenge. Justice Stevens
explained:
[D]evelopers and investors may market specialized estates to take
advantage of the Court's new rule. The smaller the estate, the more
likely that a regulatory change will effect a total taking. Thus, an
investor may, for example, purchase the right to build a multifamily
home on a specific lot, with the result that a zoning regulation that
allows only single-family homes would render the investor's property
interest "valueless." In short, the categorical rule will likely have one
of two effects: Either courts will alter the definition of the
"denominator" in the takings "fraction," rendering the Court's
categorical rule meaningless, or investors will manipulate the
relevant property interests, giving the Court's rule sweeping effect.44
40. Id. at 1053-56 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); id. at lo67-68 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1059-60 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1059 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 MeL) 55, 57 (1846)).
43. Id. at lo44; seeJohn Echeverria, Lost Tree Redux: How Do We Measure Economic Impact?,
TAKINGS LrrIG. (June 4, 2015), https://takingslitigation.com/2015/o6/0 4 /lost-tree-redux-how-
do-we-measure-economic-impact (writing in favor of environmental value, such as private
recreational value to be considered in the Lucas takings analysis).
44. Lucas, 505 U.S. at lo65-66 (StevensJ., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
1854 [VOI. 102:1847
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He also wrote that "[t] he Court's [decision] effectively freezes the State's
common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional power to revise
the law governing the rights and uses of property."45
Justice Souter anticipated these nuisance abatement cases in his separate
Lucas statement.46 He wrote that the Court's opinion assumes cases may arise
in which nuisance abatement under state law could preclude all economically
beneficial use of land.47 Actually, Justice Souter doubted that regulations to
prevent nuisances would cause total deprivations in most cases.48 Emphasizing
that nuisance law's focus is conduct on the property and "not on the character
of the property" itself, he wrote that nuisance remedies typically leave the
owner with the right to engage in reasonable uses of the property.49 "Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine property that can be used only to create a nuisance,
such that its sole economic value must presuppose the right to occupy it for
such seriously noxious activity."so
Together, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter raised substantial
questions about how the Court's new rule in Lucas would play out.5' It is clear
from their responses to the Lucas majority that Justices Stevens and Souter
were concerned about an unhealthy amount of gamesmanship being inserted
into the takings analysis by both property owners and courts.52 For Lucas
critics, the decision further muddied the already murky regulatory takings
waters, increasing the unpredictability and ambiguity in regulatory takings.5s
Next, this Article turns to the ambiguities remaining after Lucas.
D. AMBIGUTIES ABOUND
"Jerold Kayden, a senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy ...
[said] shortly [after Lucas was decided] that 'the issue of what is the property
45. Id. at 1068-69.
46. Id. at 1077-78 (Souter,J., separate statement).
47. Id. at 1077.
48. Id. at 1077.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1078.
51. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
52. Lucas, 505 U.S. at lo66 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1077-78 (Souter, J., separate
statement).
53. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
93, 141-42 (2002) ("[T]here is an unfortunate tendency to understand the automatic,
handwringing critique of vagueness in takings doctrine as automatically recommending clearer
rules that favor protection of private property. An assumption that clear rules are always better
should be resisted. Clarity is only one value within the Rule of Law, and while it may contribute
to stability in many circumstances, it may not contribute to overall efficiency or fairness here.");
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 56 1,
566 (1984) (arguing that the analysis for regulatory takings "is deeply flawed"); Jed Rubenfeld,
Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1o81 (1993) ("Takings law is out of joint" and "only the right of
privacy [constitutional doctrine] can compete seriously with takings law for the doctrine-in-most-
desperate-need-of-a-principle prize.").
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interest at stake is going to be a whole new battleground. Defining what the
property is determines whether the owner wins or loses.'54 One question that
arises after Lucas is the categorical takings rule and whether it turns on a
denial of all economic value or denial of all economic use.55 A second question
is whether statutory nuisances count when considering the Lucas nuisance
exception or only common-law nuisances.5 6 Yet a third question is the
denominator question-in other words, what is the relevant property interest
against which the government's regulatory impact should be measured?57
Below, we discuss these lingering uncertainties surrounding the Lucas rule,
the exceptions to that rule, and the denominator question.
i. The Categorical Regulatory Takings Rule
The first question that arises is whether the Lucas categorical rule turned
on denial of economic value or economic use. In other words, if a regulation
eliminated all use but left a property owner with non-speculative or even
speculative value, would the Lucas analysis apply or would the Penn Central
balancing test applysS Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States held that environmental
value should be disregarded for purposes of the Lucas taking claim and that
only economic value should be considered.59 However, the court did not
distinguish between value and use.6 o
The distinction between value and use has caused considerable
confusion. In fact, courts and other legal authorities differ on this point. Some
contend that the Court's opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency6' endorses loss of value as the Lucas rule.6 2 In
other words, "[a] nything less than a 'complete elimination of value,' or a 'total
loss,' . . . would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central"6s Other
54. Rebecca Retzlaff & Sarah Sisser, Property Rights and Coastal Protection: The Case ofLucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 29 PLAN. PERSP. 275, 286 (2014) (quoting David W. Dunlap,
Resolving Property 'Takings,' N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 23, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/o8/
23/realestate/resolving-property-takings.html).
55. See infta Part II.D.i.
56. See infra Part II.D.2.
57. See infra Part IID.3 .
58. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
59. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3 d 1i11, 1116-17 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
6o. Id.
61. See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002).
62. SeeRichardJ. Lazarus, Lucas Unspun, 16 SE. ENVTL.L.J. 13, 28 & n.99 (2007) (discussing
the Lucas decision in the context of economic value and citing to the Tahoe-Sierra decision and
others as interpreting the Lucas decision in the total diminution of all value context).
63. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1019 n.8 (1992)); see also, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) ("In the
Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative
factor."); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 935 (Tex. 1998) ("A restriction denies
1856 [VOI. 102:1847
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courts and scholars have argued in favor of the loss of use construction of the
Lucas categorical takings rule.64
An understanding of the Lucas categorical regulatory takings rule as only
applying when a government regulation deprives an owner of all value would
significantly heighten the already substantial impediments to property
owners' ability to mount successful Lucas challenges. 65 It is difficult to imagine
a situation in which a speculator could not be found who would pay some de
minimis amount for a property even if the property had been completely
deprived of all development rights and even temporarily deprived of all rights
of use.66 The law is dynamic, and this dynamism, with the potential of
favorable future regulatory change for a property owner, creates speculative
the landowner all economically viable use of the property or totally destroys the value of the
property if the restriction renders the property valueless. Determining whether all economically
viable use of a property has been denied entails a relatively simple analysis of whether value
remains in the property after the governmental action." (citations omitted)); Daniel L. Siegel &
Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unresolved Questions, ii VT.J. ENVTL. L. 479,
498 (2010) ("Lucas turns on the loss of value, not the inability to use property.").
64. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3 d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A
'categorical' taking is, by accepted convention, one in which all economically viable use, i.e., all
economic value, has been taken by the regulatory imposition. Such a taking is distinct from a
taking that is the consequence of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts only some of
the uses that would otherwise be available to the property owner, but leaves the owner with
substantial viable economic use."); Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 493 (2009)
("[T]here appears to be no genuine issue of material fact that Corps' denial of plaintiffs' 404
permit application left plaintiffs without economically viable use of the project site. Thus,
plaintiffs' claim falls under Lucas rather than Tahoe-Sierra and Penn Central, and the Corps' denial
of the 404 permit may very well have left plaintiffs without economically viable use of their
property."); Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 669 S.E.2d 286, 290 (N.C.
2oo8) (discussing Lucas takings in the context of denials of "practical use and reasonable value");
Ann T. Kadlecek, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Regulatory
Takings, 68 WASH. L. REV. 415, 427 (1993) ("The Lucas Court indicated two factors that are
relevant to determining whether property has an economically viable use. The first is the
remaining market value of the land. If a regulation renders property 'valueless', then no
economically viable use remains. . . . The second factor is the remaining uses available to the
landowner. The Court gave little specific guidance for the application of this factor, but did
indicate that a regulation that requires land to be left substantially in its natural state deprives the
owner of economically viable use.").
65. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3 d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("To
establish a per se claim under the government's reading of Lucas, a landowner would have to
demonstrate that a regulation destroyed all land value, regardless of its source [economic and
non-economic value, i.e. environmental value]. Yet the fact that the landowner could make such
a showing, according to the government's hypothetical, would prompt speculation giving rise to
post-regulation land value. In other words, speculators would value otherwise valueless land based
solely on the possibility that a Lucas taking could be maintained and that a takings judgment
could be won. Land value resulting from such speculation would defeat the very Lucas claim on
which the speculation was based.").
66. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065 n-3 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Lucas may put his land to 'other uses'-fishing or camping, for example-or may
sell his land to his neighbors as a buffer. In either event, his land is far from 'valueless."').
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value at some price point.67 Moreover, if Lucas is understood as only applying
when there is no value, so that even speculative value counts against the Lucas
takings claim, then it truly is difficult to make the case of a Lucas categorical
taking. In order to truly have no value, we would need to see the lack of
development potential combine with other negative factors such as
environmental remediation costs, holding costs, demolition costs, and
property tax liability to create "negative value."68
2. The Nuisance Defense
A second question is whether both statutory nuisances and common-law
nuisances count when considering the nuisance defense to a Lucas claim or,
instead, whether common-law nuisances are the only ones that should be
considered. 69 The difference between common law and statutory law matters.
If the nuisance exception to a categorical Lucas taking is limited to only
common-law nuisances, then the only nuisances that can defeat a plaintiffs
right to compensation under the Lucas categorical rule are those long-
standing nuisances that we have already agreed on collectively as being
nuisances. If statutory nuisances can also defeat a Lucas claim, then any
legislature can pass nuisance statutes to "pull the rug" right out from under a
plaintiff who has already proven a Lucas claim by establishing a total
deprivation of economically beneficial or productive use of land as a result of
government regulation.7o
One reading of Justice Scalia's majority opinion is that by background
principles of nuisance, the Court intended a narrow construction of nuisance
doctrine in this instance to include only background principles of common-law
nuisance.Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion addressed this reading of the
majority opinion and, in fact, he wrote that our whole legal tradition must be
considered.7' In his more expansive view of the nuisance exception, "[t] he
common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory
power" and the states "should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory
initiatives" that respond to our interdependent, complex, and changing
society.7- Moreover, he criticized the Supreme Court of South Carolina for
citing general purposes supporting the enactment of the Beachfront
Management Act without also making findings as to whether the regulation
67. Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 787 F.d at 1118.
68. See infra notes 195-200, 248-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the
courts found negative value).
69. For a more in-depth discussion of the nuisance exception defense, see generally Brown,
supra note 28 (discussing categories of defenses and surveying cases).
70. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 (discussing the newly enacted State measures and the
elimination of "all economically valuable use").
71. Id. at 1035 (KennedyJ., concurring).
72. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
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was consistent with the property owner's reasonable expectations of use.73
Dissenting Justices Blackmun and Stevens also criticized the majority's
nuisance exception as unduly elevating common-law nuisance over statutory
nuisance.74
A final ambiguity that surfaces in the nuisance defense area, and one
discussed in depth in Part III, is that the successful Lucas cases in the nuisance
abatement category involve statutory nuisances, and the applicable statutes
mandated temporary closures of properties that were deemed nuisance
properties under the statutes.75 All of the cases in this category were decided
before Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
in which the Supreme Court held that in cases of prospectively temporary
takings, the takings analysis should occur under the Penn Central three-part
balancing test and not the Lucas categorical takings test.7 6
3. The Denominator Question and the Parcel as a Whole
The "denominator question" is the third question, and it asks, what is the
"relevant parcel" against which the government's regulatory impact should be
measured?77 In determining whether a regulation meets the Lucas test of
denying the property owner of all economically beneficial or productive use
of land, courts have traditionally used an "economic value fraction."8 The
numerator is the loss of value of the private property attributable to the impact
of the government regulation.79 The denominator is the relevant parcel
against which the regulatory impact should be judged.o For a Lucas
categorical taking, the denominator must be at least virtually equal to the
numerators1 such that there is a deprivation of "all economically beneficial or
productive use of land."8 ' As a result, property owners want to define their
denominator so that it is as small as possible while the government wants to
broadly define the regulated property to keep the denominator as large as
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1052-53 (BlackmunJ., dissenting); id. at io68-69 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
75. See infra Part III.A.
76. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331-32,
342 (2002).
77. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
78. Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 261-62 (2001), affd, 303 F.3 d 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
79. Id.; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
8o. Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 261.
81. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6o6, 631 (2001) (stating in the context of the Lucas
total takings analysis that, "[a]ssuming a taking is otherwise established, a State may not evade
the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a token interest"); Lost
Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3 d 1111, 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding a 99.4%
diminishment in value and "affirm[ing] that a Lucas taking occurred because the government's
permit denial eliminated all value stemming from Plat 57's possible economic uses").
82. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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possible.83 Thus, the resolution of the denominator question is critical to the
success or failure of a Lucas challenge.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City is the landmark relevant
parcel decision. 84 In this case, the Supreme Court held that the relevant parcel
in the denominator of the takings fraction is the entirety of the owner's "rights
in the parcel as a whole."1 5 The parcel-as-a-whole approach tends to increase
the property owner's denominator, making the Lucas regulatory takings
challenge less viable. Courts have rejected Lucas takings challenges by
applying the parcel-as-a-whole analysis.86
The parcel-as-a-whole analysis exists in contrast to a segmentation or
"conceptual severance"87 approach to property, whether vertical,88
83. KENDALL ET AL., supra note 8, at 170; Wright, supra note 9, at 191.
84. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
85. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
86. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331
(2002) ("Petitioners seek to bring this case under the rule announced in Lucas by arguing that
we can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each landowner's fee simple
estate, and then ask whether that segment has been taken in its entirety by the moratoria. Of
course, defining the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is
circular. With property so divided, every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium and
the normal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings. Petitioners' 'conceptual
severance' argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory
takings cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.' We have consistently rejected such an
approach to the 'denominator' question." (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31)).
87. See Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 737 S.E.2d 601, 615 & n.14
(S.C. 2013) ("The United States Supreme Court has indicated several times that 'piecemealing'
various property interests is not permitted. . . . However, other United States Supreme Court
decisions have implicitly acknowledged, though never explicitly held, that 'conceptual severance'
of a parcel can be appropriate under the particular facts presented." (citations omitted));
MargaretJane Radin, The Liberal Conception ofProperty: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674 (1988) (reviewing some of the "salient" Supreme Court cases
addressing conceptual severance); Angela Chang, Note, Demystifying Conceptual Severance: A
Comparative Study of the United States, Canada, and the European Court of Human Rights, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 965, g66 (2013) ("Conceptual severance refers to plaintiffs' attempts to conceptually
sever their property physically, functionally, or temporally to show that a regulation diminishes a
significant portion or ioo% of the parcel's value." (footnote omitted)). See generally Dwight H.
Merriam, What is the Relevant Parcel in Takings Litigation?, SC4 3 ALI-ABA 505 (1998) (describing
the various ways in which courts separate parcels for takings analysis).
88. See Dunes W Golf Club, 737 S.E.2d at 615 n.14 (describing vertical severance as "division
of subsurface, surface, and air rights"); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137 (discussing the
transferability of air rights).
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horizontal,8 9 temporal,90 or functional.9' Conceptual severance reflects the
idea of real property as a bundle of rights consisting of many strands that can
be severed or destroyed.92 Conceptual severance would include
vertical severance (division of subsurface, surface, and air rights);
temporal severance (division of property based on the time
regulation is in effect and not in effect-i.e. temporary takings);
functional severance (division of property interests based on
easements, rights of way, and servitudes); and horizontal severance
(subdivision of a parcel into smaller lots).93
89. See Dunes W. Golf Club, 737 S.E.2d at 615 n.14 (describing horizontal severance as
"subdivision of parcel into smaller lots"); see also generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6o6
(2011) (applying the appropriate takings framework to lots); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United
States, 787 F. 3 d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (same).
go. See Dunes W Golf Club, 737 S.E.2d at 615 n.14 (describing temporal severance as "division of
property based on the time regulation is in effect and not in effect"); see also Tahoeierra, 535 U.S. at
318-19 (discussing temporal segmentation in the moratorium context).
91. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 318 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'1 Planning Agency, 216 F.3 d 764, 774 (gth Cir. 2000)) ("[T]he dimensions of a property
interest may include ... a functional dimension (which describes the extent to which an owner
may use or dispose of the property in question) . . . ."); Dist Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District
of Columbia, 198 F.3 d 874, 88o (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that in defining the relevant parcel for
the takings analysis, "the parcel should be functionally coherent. In other words, more should
unite the property than common ownership by the claimant. Thus, a court must also consider
how both the property-owner and the government treat (and have treated) the property"); Dunes
W Golf Club, 737 S.E.2d at 615 n.14 ("[F]unctional severance [is the] division of property
interests based on easements, rights of way, and servitudes . . . ."); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 717 (1987) ("[C]omplete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular class
of property may be a taking."); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)
(holding that rights to exclude fall within a "category of interests that the Government cannot
take without compensation"). As the cases illustrate, the concept of a functional dimension can
be used in two different ways. In District Intown, it means how the numerous parcels are used
together. But in Tahoe-Sierra, it likely includes the potential for permitting.
92. See Chang, supra note 87, at 973.
93. Dunes W Golf Club, 737 S.E.2d at 615 n.14; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 318, (2002) ("Property interests may have many
different dimensions. For example, the dimensions of a property interest may include a physical
dimension (which describes the size and shape of the property in question), a functional
dimension (which describes the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the property in
question), and a temporal dimension (which describes the duration of the property interest). At
base, the plaintiffs' argument is that we should conceptually sever each plaintiffs fee interest into
discrete segments in at least one of these dimensions-the temporal one-and treat each of those
segments as separate and distinct property interests for purposes of takings analysis. Under this
theory, they argue that there was a categorical taking of one of those temporal segments."
(quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3 d 764, 774(gth Cir. 2000))); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 330 (1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("Regulations are three dimensional;
they have depth, width, and length. As for depth, regulations define the extent to which the
owner may not use the property in question. With respect to width, regulations define the amount
of property encompassed by the restrictions. Finally, ... regulations set forth the duration [or
length] of the restrictions.").
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The more factors courts include in the property owner's denominator as an
expression of the extent and nature of the owners' rights in property
impacted by regulation, the less viable the Lucas takings challenge becomes.94
Justice Stevens expressed concern in his Lucas dissent about
manipulating the denominator.95 He said that Lucas's categorical rule would
"likely have one of two effects: Either courts [would] alter the definition of
the 'denominator'" to neutralize the Lucas categorical rule, or property
owners would alter the denominator by manipulating their property interests
to reduce the denominator in the takings fraction, thereby giving the
categorical rule broader effect than intended by the Lucas majority.9 6
These concerns were given new life in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's decision in Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States.97 In
response to the government's arguments about gaming to better the chances
of a Lucas claim, the Lost Tree court stated "that if such strategic behavior
presented itself, '[o]ur precedent displays a flexible approach, designed to
account for factual nuances.'"98 Noted scholarJohn Echeverria wrote that the
court's recent decision in Lost Tree "deepens the mystery surrounding the
Lucas per se rule" and incorrectly "divorces takings analysis from the realities
of the actual marketplace in land."99 He opined that the takings analysis is
"already subject to too much gamesmanship" and that it is likely to "become
more random and unpredictable" if future courts follow the Lost Tree
precedent.oo It therefore should be unsurprising that the denominator
problem is a recurring issue of contemporary significance.
How much do these lingering ambiguities matter? To the answer to that
question, and the Lucas winners, we turn next.
III. SUCCESSFUL LUCAs TAKINGS CASES: EMPIRICAL DATA
This Part presents the results of an examination of approximately 1,700
Lucas cases filed across the United States. Of those 1,700 cases, only 27 were
successful. What the Lucas winners had in common helps clarify Lucas in
practice. In the discussion below, we group the Lucas winning cases into the
following categories: (i) the nuisance abatement cases; (2) private
94. See supra Part II.D.g.
95. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
g6. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1o66 (1992) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
97. See generally Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 7 87 F.3 d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The
factual details of Lost Tree are discussed in detail later. See infra Part III.B; see also supra text
accompanying notes 42 and 90 (discussing Stevens's opinion that the effect of Lucas's categorical
rule will be to incentivize courts and property owners to attempt to game the denominator in the
takings equation).
98. Lost Tree, 787 F.3 d at 11 18 (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. Y. United States, 28 F.3 d
1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
99. Echeverria, supra note 43.
loo. Id.
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agreements and the denominator; (3) public law and pyramidal
segmentation; and (4) delay theory.1o
While analyzing the Lucas winners, at times we compare and contrast
several of the Lucas losers. There are almost 1,700 losers so we only discuss
Lucas losers where we believe they can help us understand the winners. To a
discussion of the cases, by category, we turn next.
A. THE NuISANCE ABATEMENT CASES (THE LUCAs EXCEPTION)
In this category, we can see the nuisance exception to the Lucas
categorical rule play out. Several cases concretely make the point of the
impact of the nuisance defense on the Lucas takings challenge: The less viable
the nuisance defense (e.g., because statutory nuisances are deemed not to
count for Lucas nuisance defense purposes or because when they do count,
the government's application is overly broad), the more viable the Lucas
categorical claim.102 These four cases represent seven disputes because two of
the four cases are consolidated cases with multiple disputes.os
First, in City ofSeattle v. McCoy, the City brought a proceeding to abate the
McCoys' operation of their lounge and restaurant (Oscar's II) under a drug
nuisance statute.1 04 The McCoys' property interest was a leasehold on the
property on which Oscar's II was located.o5 The trial court found Oscar's II
101. See infra Appendix (presenting the categories of Lucas winning cases).
1o2. See supra Part II.D.2.
103. Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 8o So. 2d 864 , 866 (Fla. 2001) (consolidating two cases:
City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., 717 SO. 2d 6o1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) and City of St. Petersburg v.
Kablinger 730 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)); State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d
81, 83-85 (Ohio 1998) (consolidating three cases, numbers 96-1894, 96-1895, and 96-1897).
104. City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P-3 d 159, 163 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). McCoy was the only
nuisance exception case in which the owner restricted the denominator by acquiring only a
leasehold interest. The First English dissent likely imagined this type of case when describing the
qualities of temporary Lucas takings. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Churh of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 329 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A temporary
interference with an owner's use of his property may constitute a taking for which the
Constitution requires that compensation be paid. At least with respect to physical takings, the
Court has so held. Thus, if the government appropriates a leasehold interest and uses it for a
public purpose, the return of the premises at the expiration of the lease would obviously not erase
the fact of the government's temporary occupation." (citation omitted)). A leasehold of
sufficiently short remaining duration and a sufficiently lengthy nuisance abatement closure-
when combined with other factors such as insufficient tailoring and acquiescence or participation
by the owner in the nuisance activity-might be sufficient to overcome the First English dissent
and the Tahoe-Sierra Court's caution against temporal segmentation in the application of the
Lucas categorical rule and its nuisance exception. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) ("Thus, the District Court erred when it
disaggregated petitioners' property into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at
issue and then analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use during
each period. The starting point for the court's analysis should have been to ask whether there
was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central was the proper framework."
(citation omitted)).
105. McCoy, 4 P.3d at 162.
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to be a drug nuisance and ordered it closed for one year.,o6 The trial court's
order resulted in Oscar's II being placed in the court's custody pursuant to
an applicable statutory provision.o7 On appeal, the court found that
application of the nuisance statute to the McCoys was a temporary taking.1o8
The court articulated the nuisance exception as "whether the common law of
nuisance would have allowed abatement of the lawful business activity against
an innocent owner for the illegal drug activities of unidentified business
patrons which, when the activities occurred, were unknown and may not have
been observable."os The court determined that the McCoys were innocent
owners, that they acted reasonably to attempt to abate the nuisance, and that
the common-law nuisance exception in that state was based upon whether the
owners, given their constructive and actual knowledge, took reasonable steps
to abate the nuisance.no The court held that the City did not meet its burden
of proving a common-law nuisance according to the Lucas exception.,11
Second, City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen involved application of a nuisance
abatement statute to the property owner's 15-unit apartment complex.,12
Bowen owned the apartment complex that was ordered closed for one year
after being found to constitute a statutory nuisance because of purported
drug use by tenants and others who were on the property." 3 The court found
a temporary Lucas taking because the building could not be put to any
economic use during the one-year closure period."4 The court stated that the
Lucas exception limited the matter to common-law nuisances and that no
common-law nuisance doctrine prohibited using a building for rental
purposes. '5
Third, Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami"6 consolidated two cases, City of St.
Petersburg v. Kablinger7m and City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc." The property
owners in the two cases owned an apartment complex and a motel,
respectively."9 The court considered whether ordering the complete closure
of the apartment complex for one year and the complete closure of the motel
lo6. Id. at 164 .
107. Id. at 166.
io8. Id. at 167.
109. Id.
io. Id.at171-72.
Ill. Id.
112. City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 SO. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
113. Id. at 627-28.
114. Id. at 631.
115. Id.
1 16. See generally Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 8oi So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001).
117. See generally City of St. Petersburg v. Kablinger, 730 SO. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
118. See generally City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., 717 SO. 2d 6oi (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
119. Keshbro, 8o So. 2d at 867-68.
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for six months for violation of public nuisance statutes deprived the owners
of all economically beneficial use of their property.120
The court found that the regulation in Kablinger resulted in a Lucas taking
and that the Lucas nuisance exception did not apply.21 However, in Keshbro,
the court said the nuisance exception did apply and was a defense to the
property owner's claim of a Lucas categorical taking." The reason for the
different results was the question of specific tailoring of the closure orders "to
abate the objectionable conduct, without unnecessarily infringing upon the
conduct of a lawful enterprise."1s The temporary closing of the apartment in
Kablinger, according to the court, was not attended by the same extensive
record indicating that the nuisance (drug activity) had become inextricable
from the operation of the motel in Keshbro.14 Absent such a record, the court
found the closure order for one year in Kablinger was not sufficiently tailored
to benefit from the Lucas nuisance exception."5 In contrast, the court found
that the drug and prostitution activity at the Stardust Motel in Keshbro "had
become part and parcel of the operation of the Stardust" and that the City of
Miami had failed to eradicate this nuisance activity despite patient attempts."6
Finally, the Ohio case of State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah involved three
consolidated cases in which the property interest was a fee simple absolute in
residential property. 2 7 In all three cases, it was alleged that non-owner
residents, while occupying three different residential properties, committed
drug-related felonies. 8 Each property owner was found to have taken
affirmative, good faith action to investigate and remove offending residents."9
The court found that application of the nuisance abatement statute was a
Lucas taking as it required, upon the finding of a nuisance, the issuance of a
temporary, one-year closure order forbidding use of the property for any
purpose. 30
In summary, each of these cases shows that when courts perceive that the
statutory nuisance defenses are weak or unsupported, sometimes because they
are inconsistent with common-law nuisance principles, then the likely result
is that the Lucas claim will be successful. However, in these statutory nuisance
cases, it bears noting that all of these cases were decided before Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which held that
120. Id. at 867-69.
121. Id. at 876-77.
122. Id. at 876.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 876-77.
125. Id.at877.
126. Id. at 876.
127. State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d 81, 85-86 (Ohio 19g8).
128. Id.
129. Id. at85.
13o. Id. at 9-93.
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temporary takings should be analyzed under Penn Central and not Lucas.'3'
For this reason, these nuisance abatement cases do not hold much potential
for successful Lucas takings challenges in the future.
B. PRVATE AGREEMENTS AND THE DENOMINATOR
This category consists of eight conceptual severance cases unified by
private agreements such as restrictive covenants, lease agreements, and
development plans that, in the context of public land use regulations,
reduced the property owner's denominator.3s The decisions in these
conceptual severance cases draw attention to the courts' demonstrable
inclination to include the impact of private agreements in their denominator
analysis.'s3 As one scholar recognized:
The Supreme Court has accepted some of these attempts at
conceptual severance but has failed to provide a coherent theory
justifying conceptual severance. As a result, confusion and debate
ensue among courts and commentators on how best to determine
the relevant parcel in a regulatory takings claim. Lower courts can
and do accept the plaintiffs proffered denominator without intense
scrutiny, sometimes avoiding the conceptual severance issue
altogether.34
These cases show the impact that private agreements can have: The stronger
the private agreement, the stronger the Lucas claim.
This Part discusses five of the eight successful Lucas cases in this category
in detail. The first is Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States.35 The second is
State ex rel. R. T. G., Inc. v. State.'s6 The third is Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United
States.137 The fourth is Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill. 138
The fifth case is the most recent Lucas success, Love Terminal Partners v. United
States. 39
First, the complexity of the denominator possibilities are central to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's finding of a Lucas
131. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'i Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331-32,
342 (2002).
.132. See infra Appendix.
133. See infra Part IHl.B.
134. Chang, supra note 87, at 966 (footnotes omitted).
135. See generally Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
abrogated by Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F-3 d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
136. See generally State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 2002).
137. See generally Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d i 11 1 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
138. See generally Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 669 S.E.2d 286
(N.C. 2oo8).
139. See generally Love Terminal Partners v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 389 (2016).
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taking in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States. 14o The company developed 199
acres of a 25o-acre tract before the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
("Corps") denial of the company's request for a Federal Water Pollution
Control Act ("FWPCA") section 404 permit to fill wetlands.'4' "The
Government argue[d] that the proper denominator [was] the original 250
acre[s]."l42 The court rejected this argument.143 It held that the igg acres
developed or sold before the enactment of the FWPCA and the 38.5 acres
that Loveladies essentially promised to New Jersey in exchange for permit
permission from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
were not affected by the Corps' permit denial.'44 The Federal Circuit held the
remaining 12.5 acres constituted the denominator and were left with de
minimis value after the permit denial.145 Loveladies demonstrated that intent
to develop its property long before the state and federal regulatory
environment changed was important to the court's conclusion that Loveladies
had treated its acreage as legally separate parcels and that, for purposes of the
relevant-parcel analysis, the entire 250 acres did not constitute the relevant
parcel, as the government argued.14 6
Second, in State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, R.T.G., Inc. ("RTG") owned
surface and coal rights in fee simple in approximately 200 acres, and it leased
or owned coal rights in approximately 3oo acres.'47 The state designated "a
substantial portion of RTG's property" as unsuitable for mining ("UFM").148
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the UFM designation resulted in a
Lucas
taking of RTG's coal that lies under the tracts of land in which RTG
owned only coal rights and that are located within the UFM-
designated area, as well as the coal rights that lie under the tracts of
land that RTG owned in fee and that are located in the UFM-
designated area.'49
Central to the court's takings analysis was the mineral rights law of Ohio,
pursuant to which, "coal rights are severable and may be considered as a
separate property interest if the property owner's intent was to purchase the
140. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3 d at 1173, 1183 (upholding a just-compensation award of
$2,658,ooo issued by the United States Claims Court).
141. Id.at1173n.1,18o-81.
142. Id.atii8o.
143. Id.atis81.
144. Id. (stating that the government failed to convince the court that the trial court was
wrong in concluding that the land developed or sold before the regulatory environment existed
should not be included in the denominator).
145. Id.at1i81.
146. Id. at 1183.
147. State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, lool (Ohio 2002).
148. Id.
149. Id.
18672o017]
IOWA LAWREVIEW
property solely for the purpose of mining the coal."so In tackling the
denominator issue, the court analyzed the relevant parcel in the vertical and
horizontal contexts.'s' The court determined that in the vertical context, the
coal rights were the relevant parcel for the regulatory takings analysis. ' And,
in the horizontal context, the court rejected the state's argument that the
relevant parcel was all 500 acres of RTG property pursuant to the parcel-as-a-
whole rule.'53 Of the 500 contiguous acres of RTG property, approximately
1oo acres were "located outside the UFM-designated area."54 These "fringe
amounts of coal" outside of the UFM-designated area became economically
impracticable for RTG to mine after the UFM designation prevented RTG
from mining nearly 1.3 million tons of coal located within the UFM-
designated area.'5s Thus, the court found the relevant parcel in the horizontal
context to be limited to RTG's property located within the UFM-designated
area because RTG could not economically mine the coal outside of the UFM-
designated area independent of the coal reserves within the UFM-designated
area.'s
6
The third and fourth cases, Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States'57 and
Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 58 are perfectly
emblematic of the potential for private agreements to transform the
denominator for purposes of the Lucas analysis. In the third case, Lost Tree,
a Florida property owner and land developer, sought a section 404 permit
from the Corps to fill wetlands on a 4.99-acre parcel (Plat 57).159 Plat 57,
along with another parcel, Plat 55, and some scattered wetlands, were the
remaining parcels from approximately 1,3oo acres that Lost Tree purchased
and developed over more than two decades.1so Lost Tree built several homes
around Plat 57 but did not consider developing Plat 57 until 2002, when the
impetus for developing Plat 57 was to use mitigation credits that accrued
because of improvements made by a neighboring landowner.O1 It obtained
all state and local approvals but the Corps denied Lost Tree's wetland fill
150. Id. at ioo8.
151. Id. at loo7-o9.
152. Id. at loog.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See generally Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3 d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(holding that denying a wetland fill permit was a regulatory taking).
158. See generally Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 669 S.E.2d 286
(N.C. 2oo8) (holding that the town board was obligated to consider an environmental regulation
when determining how a property owner might use the property).
159. Lost Tree, 787 F.3 d at 1113-14.
16o. Id.
161. Id.ats11 3 .
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permit application because it said less environmentally damaging alternatives
were available. 6 2
The government argued that the relevant denominator was the entire
John's Island Community, about 1,3oo acres previously developed by Lost
Tree. 63 Lost Tree argued that the denominator was solely Plat 57.164 As in
Loveladies Harbor, the private agreements in Lost Tree that were critical to the
success of the Lucas takings claim were Lost Tree's formal and informal
development plans and its course of development over more than 20 years
that resulted in the court treating Plat 57 as a separate economic unit from
Lost Tree's other holdings.'6 5 The court evaluated Lost Tree's economic
expectations with respect to its scattered holdings to determine which of Lost
Tree's properties made up its denominator.'6 6 The court refused to extend
the parcel-as-a-whole analysis to include Lost Tree's disparate real-estate
holdings in the denominator along with Plat 57 and instead chose "a 'flexible
approach, designed to account for factual nuances. '"167
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the
denominator was Plat 57 alone and that Lost Tree's other holdings in the
vicinity of Plat 57 could not be aggregated because "Lost Tree had
[established] distinct economic expectations for . . . its scattered ...
holdings." 6 8 The court articulated the following three guidelines for
establishing the denominator: "First, the property interest [that is] taken
[should] not [be] defined in terms of the regulation being challenged . . . ."169
Instead, "the takings analysis must focus on 'the parcel as a whole."'170 Second,
all of the property owner's disparate holdings and properties that are located
"in the vicinity of the regulated property" are not to be included in the parcel
as a whole. 17 Finally, the critical issue in determining the relevant parcel is
the economic expectations of property owners with regard to the regulated
property when they own or have previously held other properties in the
vicinity of the regulated property. 72 If such property owners "treat[] several
legally distinct parcels as a single economic unit, together they may constitute
162. Id. at 1113-14.
163. See id. at 1113-14; Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States (Lost Tree 1), 707 F.3 d 1286,
1291 (Fed. Cit. 2013). Lost Tree developed the John's Island community beginning in 1969
through the mid-i99os. Id. at 1288.
164. Lost Tree l, 707 F. 3 d at 1291.
165. Id. at 1293-94.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1293 (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3 d 1171, 1181 (Fed.
Cir. 1994)).
168. Id. at 1294.
169. Id. at 1292 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe-Sierra Reg'I Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)).
170. Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331).
171. Id. at 1292-93.
172. Id. at 12 9 3 .
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the relevant parcel" for the takings analysis. '73 "Conversely, even when
contiguous land is purchased ... the relevant parcel may be a subset of the
original purchase where the [property] owner develops distinct parcels at
different times and treats the parcels as distinct economic units."'74
On remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the permit denial
reduced the value of Plat 57 by 99.4%, from $4,245,387.93 (the value of Plat
57 with the permit and ready for development as a home site) to $27,500
(Plat 57's nominal value without the permit).'75 The court said that such a
diminution in value was a taking under the Lucas categorical framework.'7 6
When the government appealed the award in favor of Lost Tree in 2015,
it argued that Lost Tree's ability to sell the affected parcel left Lost Tree with
an economic use, thereby precluding the per se Lucas treatment.77 Rejecting
this argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that the Lucas decision did not stand for the proposition "that a land sale
qualifies as an economic use."'7 8 The court observed that typical economic
uses would allow owners to benefit from their actual ownership of land instead
of requiring the owner to sell the affected parcel to realize any benefit.'79 The
court further noted that the government's argument would lead to a
circularity in which no landowner could ever win a Lucas challenge.
According to the government's framing, a landowner would have to
demonstrate total deprivation by regulation of all land value, including
speculative value, to win a Lucas challenge.,so This showing would prompt
land speculators to attribute value to the land that was otherwise valueless,
based upon the potential viability of a winning Lucas claim.' 8' This attribution
of land value based upon speculation would mean that "the very Lucas claim
on which the speculation was based" would be defeated.' 8 2
Fourth, Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill is another
compelling example of the interplay of private agreements, public land
regulation, and the challenges facing local government decision-makers. ,83
In this case, it was the local government's enactment of the Resource
173. Id. (quoting Forest Props., Inc.v. United States, 177 F.3 d 136o, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
174. Id.
175. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States (Lost Tree CFC H), 115 Fed. Cl. 219, 233 (2014).
176. Id. (stating that the diminution in value was also a compensable taking under the Penn
Central framework).
177. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3 d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
178. Id.
179. Id.
18o. Id.at1118.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 66g S.E.2d 286
(N.C. 2008).
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Conservation District ("RCD") ordinance, in combination with the impact of
private restrictive covenants that gave rise to the Lucas takings claim.' 84 Chapel
Hill Title and Abstract and Jonathan and Lindsay Starr ("Chapel Hill Title")
sought and were denied a variance from the Town of Chapel Hill and the
Board of Adjustments to construct a home on a vacant lot zoned for
residential use. 8s Most of the lot, 78.5%, was in the RCD and subject to an
ordinance that prohibited construction within the RCD. 86 The remaining
21-5% was located outside of the RCD and was burdened by a restrictive
covenant preventing construction of a home on this portion.'8 7 The
combination of the RCD ordinance and the restrictive covenant meant that,
absent a variance from the RCD ordinance, Chapel Hill Title would not be
able to build on the lot.' 8 8
The case was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, which articulated the legal question as "whether the Board should
consider the operation of the RCD ordinance independently, or in
conjunction with, the effect of the private restrictive covenants, when
determining if [Chapel Hill Title was] entitled to a variance."1 89 The court
determined that the RCD ordinance required the Board of Adjustment "to
consider the actual state in which the property is found-including both its
physical and legal conditions-and how those conditions interact with the
RCD ordinance, when determining if a variance is necessary to leave an owner
with a 'legally reasonable use' of the property."19o Ultimately, the court held
that the board of adjustment did not properly consider the available uses of
the entire lot for the property owners within the context of the restrictive
covenants and the RCD ordinance.91
Justice Brady, concurring, made the Lucas takings argument. He rejected
the contention that the property outside of the RCD ordinance was
developable because the argument failed to consider the impact of the
restrictive covenants that burdened and ran with the land.192 He believed the
restrictive covenants that were imposed more than 20 years prior to the RCD
ordinance could not be separated from the other legal components of the
parcel in the evaluation of the variance request.93 He concluded that the
184. Id. at 287.
185. Id. at 286-87.
186. Id. at 287.
187. Id. at 288.
188. Id. at 287-88.
189. Id. at 288.
igo. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 290 (BradyJ., concurring).
193. Id.
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Town of Chapel Hill had two options, either grant the variance or compensate
the owners for a Lucas taking of their property.'94
The fifth case, Love Terminal Partners v. United States, is the most recent
case in this category and represents a huge win for property owners with ajust-
compensation award of $133,500,000195 The plaintiffs were leaseholders of
property located at Dallas Love Field Airport when the federal government
enacted the Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2oo6 ("WARA").,96 The
plaintiffs alleged that the enactment of WARA directly "prohibited the use of
their property" for its highest and best use as a passenger air terminal, which
also was the only use permitted under the master lease.'97 Specifically, one of
the plaintiffs' experts, whom the court found persuasive, testified that after
the enactment of WARA, "there were 'no other economical uses"' for the
leasehold property, and he "defined economical use as whether revenue
would exceed expenses."'19 Essentially, he imagined a negative-value situation
after enactment of WARA. The court concluded that because WARA
prohibited the plaintiffs from using the leased property as a commercial
airline terminal that was both the highest and best purpose of the leasehold
and also the only use permitted under the master lease, the enactment of
WARA left the property with no remalning economic value, thus, a Lucas
categorical taking of the plaintiffs' entire leasehold.99 The United States
appealed to the Federal Circuit in June of 2016.2-
In summary, the winning Lucas cases represent a reinvigoration of the
Takings Clause, albeit modest, as a check on government regulatory action
against property owners.20' The owners succeeded in establishing their
development and economic expectations in such a manner that the courts
were willing to treat the regulated parcels as separate economic units for the
purpose of the Lucas categorical takings analysis. The Lucas losers help isolate
what it takes to be a Lucas winner because the losers did not have what the
Lucas winners had. Meaning, the owners in the losing cases did not establish
sufficient factual underpinnings so that courts, looking behind the structure
194. Id.
195. Love Terminal Partners v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 389, 44o (2016), appeal docketed,
No. 16-2276 (Fed. Cir.Jun. 30, 2016).
196. Id. at 394.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 413 &n.17.
199. Id. at 4 8.
2oo. Id. at 44o.
201. See Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: TheDissents in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LoY. LA. L. REV. 955, 956 (1993) (describing Justices Scalia's and
Kennedy's Lucas opinions as "efforts to rehabilitate the Takings Clause as a limit on government
action in the teeth of an unbroken line of cases upholding state land use regulation from the
days of Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co. to the present." (footnote omitted)). See generally Carol
Necole Brown, Justice Thomas's Kelo Dissent: The Perilous and Political Nature of Public Purpose, 23
GEO. MASON L. REV. 273 (2016) (discussing a check on government takings).
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of their acquisitions and development plans, found an economic reality that
warranted treating the regulated parcel as a separate economic unit.
There are three unsuccessful Lucas challenges in this category of private
agreements and the denominator that are noteworthy for their potential to
help focus the lens on the successful Lucas challenges. The first is Appolo Fuels,
Inc. v. United States.202 The second is Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States.os The
third is National Lime & Stone Co. v. Blanchard Township.o4
At issue in the first case, Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, was whether the
government's prevention of surface mining based upon a citizen petition
pursuant to section 1272 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
("SMCRA") effected a Lucas taking of the plaintiffs property interests. 0 5
Plaintiff's property interests consisted of numerous "leases grant[ing] surface,
deep, and auger mining rights" and other unspecified fee interests located
both inside of and outside of the Creek watershed.2o 6 The government's
regulatory activity was limited to the Creek watershed, which left the plaintiff
with some areas it could mine without the government's regulatory
interference.2o7
The Appolo court rejected Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States as
providing support for the plaintiffs description of the denominator as
consisting only of the coal reserves mineable by surface that it held within the
Creek watershed.2os The court found that, based upon the plaintiffs
acquisition of its property interests more than ten years after the passage of
the SMCRA, the plaintiffs development expectations formed after the
"imposition of [the] regulatory framework" that it alleged created a taking.o9
"The relevant parcel in Loveladies coincided with the area covered by the
permit only because the remainder of plaintiffs property was either
developed before the imposition of the federal regulatory scheme or was
required by the state to remain undeveloped wetlands."1o Relying upon
factual nuances to distinguish the cases raised, the court stated that
controlling case law required it to look "beyond the regulated portion of the
property in determining the appropriate parcel as a whole"2 " and "to
consider [the] plaintiffs overall business plan for the land at issue."21
202. See generally Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 5 4 Fed. Cl. 717 (2002).
203. See generally Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3 d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
204. See generally Nat'1 Lime & Stone Co. v. Blanchard Twp., Nos. 6-o4-o4, 6-04-05, 2005 WL
2840493 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2005).
205. AppoloFuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 722.
2o6. Id. at 726.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 724, 726-27.
209. Id. at 727-28.
210. Id. at 727.
211. Id. at 725; see also State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1oo6 (Ohio 2002)
(adopting the definition of the denominator as consisting only of the regulated land).
212. AppoloFuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 730.
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Interestingly, the court reiterated what other federal courts have said:
Property owners may not engineer a successful Lucas claim.-3 While there was
no direct indication that the plaintiff's acquisitions and limitations were
strategic for improving the odds of a Lucas claim, and while the plaintiff
denied such, the court expressly noted that the plaintiff did not support its
disclaimer with any evidence. 214
In the second case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States also found Loveladies inapplicable
and rejected the property owner's argument that the relevant parcel for the
denominator was 9.4 acres of lake bottom."s Instead, the court held that the
relevant parcel was the entire 62-acre tract, consisting of the 9.4 acres of lake
bottom and 53 acres of upland property.21 6 The property owner had alleged
a Lucas taking when the government denied a section 404 dredge and fill
permit.''7
In both Loveladies and Forest Properties, the original purchase and the
owners' economic intentions at the outset were critically important in
establishing the relevant parcel through the denominator. Ultimately, what
set Forest Properties apart from Loveladies was the Forest Properties court's
perception that, from the beginning, the entire 62-acre project was one
integrated, single project that was comprised of two tracts.21 8 Forest Properties
acquired interests in a total of 62 acres, though at separate times, but always
with a single project of 62 acres in mind."s So, even though the two tracts
were legally separate, for the Forest Properties court, they were a single economic
unit and therefore properly constituted the relevant parcel of the
denominator.22o
In the third case, National Lime & Stone Co. v. Blanchard Township, the
owner argued that the court should follow the precedent of State ex rel. R. T. G.,
Inc. v. State,221 which held that pursuant to state law, "mineral rights are
recognized ... as separate property rights. Therefore ... ownership of the
coal is 'both severable and of value in its own right."'222 The property owner
purchased approximately 235 acres of real property intending to convert it
213. Id. at 727-28.
214. Id.
215. Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3 d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1364-65.
218. Id. at 1365 .
2ig. Id.
220. Id.
221. Nat'1 Lime & Stone Co. v. Blanchard Twp., Nos. 6-04-04, 6-04-05, 2005 WL 2840493, at
*7 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2005).
222. State ex reL R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, ioo8 (Ohio 2002) (citation omitted)
(quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,520 (1987) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).
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into a limestone quarry.2 2 3 The property had been previously farmed, and at
the time of its acquisition by the plaintiff, there were no restrictive zoning
ordinances in force.224 Approximately four months after the plaintiff acquired
the property, the municipality passed a zoning resolution prohibiting use of
the property as a limestone quarry.225
The court rejected RTG as binding precedent, relying upon the intent of
the purchaser as controlling guidance.21 The court distinguished the facts in
its case from those in RTG, noting that the coal company in RTG engaged in
significant testing of the property for coal deposits and spent a substantial
amount of money assessing the property's viability.227 Additionally, RTG had
successfully mined coal for several years prior to the state designating the
property as unsuitable and so had engaged in mining before the alleged
taking, unlike the property owner.22 8 Based upon these findings, the National
court concluded that RTG had done significantly more than the property
owner.2 2 9
In sum, the difference between the Lucas winners and losers turns on the
property owners' economic expectations, how those expectations shaped the
owners' use of their property, and the owners' ability to profit from the use of
their properties in the shadow of the regulatory scheme. The winners were
able to establish from their acquisition, use, and development that the
regulated property was a separate estate for purposes of defining the
denominator and that their economic expectations pre-dated the regulation
that they claimed resulted in a Lucas taking. In the losing cases, the economic
reality underlying the property arrangements inclined the courts to see the
regulated parcels as part of larger economic units that included other
unregulated property, resulting in applying the parcel-as-a-whole approach.
C. PYRAMIDAL SEGMENTATION AND PUBLIC LAWIMPACT
The parcel-as-a-whole rule addresses the segmentation of possessory
interests vertically,23o horizontally,231 temporally,232 or functionally. 233 In
contrast, what we call "pyramidal segmentation" describes segmentation of
uses under the ubiquitous zoning pyramid. The zoning pyramid, often
referred to as "cumulative" zoning, traces its roots back to the landmark
223. Nat'lLime & Stone Co., 2005 WL 2840493, at *1.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *8-9.
227. Id.at*9.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 88, 151-52 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 89, 151, 153 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note gi and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court decision, Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co.234 In that case, the
Village enacted its zoning ordinance in 1922, creating six use-zoning
classifications that were based upon a pyramid of uses that increased in their
inclusiveness as one moved down the pyramid.23s The least intensive use zones
are at the very top of the zoning pyramid-e.g., single-family-and the most
intensive use zones are at the bottom of the zoning pyramid-e.g.,
industrial.3 6
Downzoning is the process of changing the allowable density on a parcel
by rezoning the property from a less restrictive use regulation category to a
more restrictive use regulation category (moving up the zoning pyramid). 237
Such rezoning, for example from commercial use to residential use, is called
downzoning because, in theory, as one moves up the zoning pyramid,
property becomes less valuable because fewer uses are permitted of the
property.235 Upzoning is changing the allowable density on a parcel by
rezoning the property from a more restrictive use regulation category to a less
restrictive use regulation category further down the zoning pyramid-for
example, moving from a single-family residential zoning classification to a
multi-family residential zoning classification. 239Property owners typically do
not object to upzoning because, in theory, property becomes more valuable
as one moves down the zoning pyramid to permit more uses of the property
and to impose fewer land use restrictions on the property.240
The 12 cases in this category show the impact of inclusionary zoning: The
less inclusive the zoning classification (meaning the less intensive the
permitted uses), the more viable the Lucas claim.24V Of the 12 cases, this
section discusses six. The first case is State ex rel. Greenacres Foundation v. City of
Cincinnati242 The second case is City of Sherman v. Wayne.243 The third case is
Steel v. Cape Corp.244 The fourth case is Galleon Bay Corp. v. Board of County
234. See generally Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
235. Id. at 3 79 -81.
236. Id. at 38o-81.
237. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth
Machine?, iiJ. EMPIRiCAL LEGALSTUD. 227, 229 (2014).
238. See id. at 238 ("[F]or parcels initially zoned for commercial, business, or
industrial uses (but not residential), as the difference between the estimated value of the
property under an alternative zoning category and its existing value increases, so does the
probability of it being rezoned.").
239. Id. at 244 & n.97.
240. See id. at 244 & n.97, 247 (describing upzoning as a process, after which, property can
be developed at great density).
241. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
242. See generally State ex rel. Greenacres Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 56 N.E. 3 d 335 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2015)-
243. See generally City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W. 3 d 34 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
244. See generally Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
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Commissioners of Monroe County.245 The fifth case is Ali v. City of Los Angeles.246
And the sixth case is Dunlap v. City of Nooksack.247
First, in State ex rel. Greenacres Foundation v. City of Cincinnati, a charitable
foundation applied for a demolition permit to remove an existing,
dilapidated single-family home that had been uninhabited since 1961.248 The
house, known as the Gamble House because it was once occupied by James N.
Gamble, the son of one of the founders of Procter & Gamble, was located on
a 2.85-acre portion of a 22-acre site owned by the Greenacres Foundation.249
The house was located on land zoned in a "single family residential district
with no historic overlay."25o After the demolition permit request, the
Cincinnati City Council imposed historic district zoning on the acreage where
the house was located.251 Ultimately, the court concluded that the demolition
permit application ought to have been processed pursuant to the law as it was
pending when Greenacres applied for the permit. 2 52 Nearly three years after
Greenacres applied for the demolition permit, the City of Cincinnati issued
the permit, and it took nearly seven additional months from the issuance of
the permit for the city to remove the historic district overlay designation from
Greenacres' property. 25s3 The court held that denial of Greenacres'
application caused a Lucas temporary regulatory taking even though it was
only part of a much larger property in single ownership because the house
was uninhabitable and could not be used without incurring extensive
expense, and use as a museum, as advocated by permit opponents, would have
required additional millions of dollars for maintenance, rendering the
property economically unviable and creating a property with negative value.254
Second, the property in City of Sherman v. Wayne had been used
commercially as an armory and vehicle storage site when the municipality
downzoned the property to a residential zone and then refused to grant the
owner non-conforming use status.2 55 The court found that enforcement of the
residential ordinance was a Lucas taking because the environmental
245. See generally Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 105 So. 3 d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012).
246. See generally Ali v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
247. See generally Dunlap v. City of Nooksack, No. 63747-9-I, 2010 WL 4159286 (Wash. Ct.
App. Oct. 25, 2010).
248. State ex rel. Greenacres Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 56 N.E. 3 d 335, 337 (Ohio Ct App.
2015).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 338.
252. Id. at 339.
253. Id. at 339-40.
254. Id. at 343-45.
255. City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W. 3 d 34, 39-40 (Tex. App. 2oo8).
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remediation costs and the lack of demand for residential use resulted in the
property having a negative value.256
Third, after the owner's property in Steel v. Cape Corp. was improperly
downzoned from a residential classification to an open space classification,
permitting no residences, the owner requested a rezoning to the original
residential classification.257 The government denied the request on the basis
that the rezoning to a residential classification would make the school
facilities inadequate.25 8 The court found that a Lucas taking resulted from the
combination of the zoning regulation and the adequate facilities ordinance
that left the property unusable for viable economic purposes.2 59 Against a
background of aberrational facts2co-impermissible rezoning of property to
an open space classification that did not include and was not intended to
include viable economic residential or commercial uses except as an accessory
to an already existing residential use-the court held that the statutory
scheme resulted in a Lucas taking.2 61
Fourth, the plaintiff in Galleon Bay Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners
owned 10.64 acres of land in fee simple.26 . Six of the acres were landlocked,
subject to utility easements and roads, or restricted by perpetual conservation
easements.63 Amendment of the Rate of Growth Ordinance in the Florida
Keys Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan made it practically impossible for
Galleon to build on the remaining 4.64 acres that were divided into 14
residential lots.2 64 The court of appeals found a Lucas taking, holding that the
trial court erred in considering the plaintiffs separately platted subdivisions
that had been developed decades earlier when the court determined the
impact of the regulation on the plaintiff.265
Fifth, in Ali v. City of Los Angeles, the property owner applied for a permit
to demolish his hotel after it "was substantially destroyed by fire in ...
256. Id. at 46-47.
257. Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634, 635-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). The downzoning
occurred at the request of an entity that improperly alleged that it held an ownership interest in
the subject property. Id. at 635-36.
258. Id. at 638-39.
259. Id. at 64 9.
260. See id. at 646 ("The hearing officer was not an owner of the property and there was no
proper application before him for RLD. He had the authority to grant or deny that particular
application, not some other application not made. We hold that to grant rezoning to a
classification not applied for was improper. Moreover, in light of his comments, we hold that the
hearing examiner/administrator, when he denied appellee's request for rezoning and purported
to grant to appellee an unsought for RLD classification, was attempting to create the new
rezoning equivalent of the South Carolina new 'special permit' procedure adopted by that state
to thwart the constitutional takings resolution.").
261. Id. at 65 o- 5 1.
262. Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 1o5 So. 3 d 555, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
263. Id. at 5 5 7- 5 8.
264. Id. at 5 62.
265. Id. at 567, 569.
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1988."266 The City thought the hotel was a single room occupancy ("SRO")
hotel and denied the demolition permit because "the City had an ordinance
[that] prohibit[ed] demoli[shing] .. . such low-income housing unless (1) it
was infeasible to repair, or (2) the owner agreed to replace it with similar
housing, or (3) the owner established extreme hardship for an exemption." 67
Almost two years later, the City determined that the hotel "was not an SRO
hotel" and issued the demolition permit.2 6 8 In the interim, the City contracted
for security for the abandoned hotel and assessed the cost against the owner,
pursuant to a City ordinance.2 69
On a previous appeal, the court held that the City's "delay in issuing the
demolition permit" pursuant to "the SRO ordinance violated the Ellis Act"
that forbade public entities from "compel [ling] . . . owner[s] of... residential
real property to offer or to continue to offer" residential property for lease or
rent. 2 70 This court found that the wrongful denial and delay in issuing the
demolition permit was not the type of "normal delay in the development
process" that allows governments to escape takings liability.271 The court
noted that the SRO ordinance's inapplicability in light of the Ellis Act was
evident from a 1988 Santa Monica rent-control ordinance case that involved
similar requirements to this case.2 72 And, because of the almost two-year delay
during which Ali could not do anything with the property, the court found
that Ali was temporarily deprived of all economically viable use and upheld
the trial court's finding of a Lucas taking.273
Interestingly, the Ali court did not decide the dispute on substantive due
process grounds even though the court, citing Landgate, Inc. v. California
Coastal Commission274 found that the delay in issuing the demolition permit
under the circumstances "was 'so unreasonable from a legal standpoint' as to
be arbitrary[] [and] not in furtherance of any legitimate governmental
objective."275 Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that nearly 20 years prior to
Ali, the United States Supreme Court said in Agins v. City of Tiburon that " [t] he
application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if
the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests."7 6 Six
266. Ali v. City of Los Angeles, gi Cal. Rptr. 2d 458, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 460.
271. Id. at 465-66.
272. Id. at 464-65 (citingJavidzad v. City of Santa Monica, 251 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App.
1g88), superseded by statute as stated in Lincoln Place Tenants Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 3 d 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).
273. Id. at 460, 465-66.
274. See generally Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998).
275. Ali, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464 (citation omitted).
276. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 26o (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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years after Ali, the Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. held that Agins's
"'substantially advances' formula ... is not a valid method of identifying
regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just
compensation."277 So, these twists and turns in Supreme Courtjurisprudence
may undermine Al's precedential value in the eminent-domain context for
future courts presented with similar facts.
Sixth and finally, a denial of an area variance was the Lucas taking
precipitant in Dunlap v. City of Nooksack.278 The plaintiff owned separate
29-5-acre and 0.25-acre parcels in fee simple.279 The 0.25-acre parcel was
zoned residential when the plaintiff requested an area variance to build a
house and to retain a constructed fence. so The court found the denial of the
variance resulted in a Lucas taking of the 0.25-acre parcel.2 81 According to the
court, though the plaintiffs could build a 480-square-foot house on the parcel,
it would not be economically viable, and the buffers rendered the remaining
95.6% of the lot useable.282
The essence of these winning Lucas cases in the pyramidal segmentation
and public law impact category is that the Lucas claim gains more strength the
more government restricts the use and development on property already
situated in the least inclusive use zones. The difference between the Lucas
winners and losers is that the winners frequently could point to some
improper, erroneous, or aggressive application by the government of its
zoning or permitting discretion that, in combination with the already
restrictive zoning, left the property valueless.2 83 In many of the winning Lucas
cases, the government seemed oblivious to the fact that the combination of
the restrictive zoning classification and the refusal to exercise its discretion in
the form of a variance denial, non-conforming use application denial, or
other development denial left the property undevelopable and even with
277. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
278. Dunlap v. City of Nooksack, No. 63747-9-1, 2010 WL 4159286, at *4-5 (Wash. Ct. App.
Oct. 25, 2010).
279. Id. at *i.
280. Id.
281. Id. at *6.
282. Id.
283. See generally Ali v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Steel v.
Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); State ex rel. Greenacres Found. v. City of
Cincinnati, 56 N.E- 3 d 335 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). Denial of a certificate of appropriateness and
the application of the Cumberland Historic Zoning Ordinance to the church to demolish a
monastery was a Lucas taking because buildings were in serious disrepair and the refusal
"require [d] the Church to maintain the Monastery at a safe standard of repair." Keeler v. Mayor
of Cumberland, 94o F. Supp. 879, 888 (D. Md. 1996). The church estimated complete
renovation costs at two million dollars, and the church estimated "[t]he cost to 'retain and
adequately maintain' the shell" and minimal building interior temperatures at $386,44o. Id. The
city "stipulated that 'no economically feasible plan can be formulated' for the preservation of the
Church buildings."' Id.
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negative value. 84 The losers in this category help isolate these distinguishing
qualities of the winning Lucas cases. They make the point of the winning cases,
just from the other side.
Next, we take a quick look at five pyramidal segmentation and public law
impact cases that were unsuccessful in joining that small, inner circle of the
winning Lucas cases in this category. The first is Erb v. Maryland Department of
the Environment. 2 85 The second is Beyer v. City ofMarathon.28 6 The third is Collins
v. Monroe County.287 The fourth is Loewenstein v. City ofLafayette.288 And the fifth
is Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial.289
First, in Erb v. Maryland Department of the Environment, the property owner
alleged a Lucas taking after being denied a permit for a septic system essential
to developing his property. 29 o The court found the property owner had not
established anything more than a great diminution in value from the present
inability to build.291 Further, there was evidence of alternative means of
sewage disposal possibly available to the owner.292 The court held that the
owner had not presented sufficient evidence of a denial of all economically
beneficial use to establish a Lucas taking.293 Additionally, unlike Steel v. Cape
Corp., in which the court found a Lucas taking after rejecting a nuisance
abatement defense and under highly unusual facts in the form of an improper
rezoning at the request of an entity with no legal interest in the rezoned
property,2 94 the Erb court held that the Maryland Department of
Environment's sewage regulatory scheme did "no more than could be
accomplished under the nuisance laws of [the] State."295
In essence, the Erb court found that in Steel v. Cape Corp. the imposition
of the zoning scheme left the property with no economic use, and the
nuisance exception did not apply to provide a defense to the Lucas taking. 9 6
In contrast, according to the Erb court, the property owner in that case did
284. See generaUy Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F-3 d 1422 (9 th
Cir. 1996), affd, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 105 So. 3 d 555
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Heaphy v. State, No. o 3 -4 5 4 07 -AA, 2004 WL 5573602 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 28, 2004); Moroney v. Mayor of Old Tappan, 633 A.2d 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993); City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W. 3 d 34 (Tex. App. 2008).
285. See generally Erb v. Md. Dep't of the Env't, 676 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
286. See generally Beyer v. City of Marathon, 197 So. 3 d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). The
Beyers were allowed to camp on the property but not build. Id. at 565.
287. See generally Collins v. Monroe County, 1 18 So. 3 d 872, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
288. Seegenerally Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
289. See generally Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr- 3 d 122 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
290. Erb, 676 A-2d at 1025-26.
291. Id. at 1026.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1027-28.
294. Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634, 650-51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
295. Erb, 676 A.2d at 1026.
296. Id.
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not meet his burden of showing a deprivation of all economic use and, even
if he had met this burden and proven that the imposition of the regulatory
scheme left his property "economically barren, no compensation would be
due because the State has a right-and, indeed, an obligation-to regulate
against the creation of nuisances."297 In other words, the nuisance defense
applied in Erb and would defeat a Lucas takings claim.
Next, the courts in two cases rejected attempts by property owners to
bring their claims under the umbrella of Galleon Bay Corp. v. Board of County
Commissioners.298 The second of the unsuccessful cases highlighted in this
category is Beyer v. City of Marathon in which the government adopted a
comprehensive plan and subsequently denied the property owners the right
to engage in any development on their property.299 The owners sued, alleging
a deprivation of all or substantially all economic use of the property.3 00 In
ruling against the owners, the Beyer court distinguished this case from Galleon
Bay in which the appeals court held that Galleon had suffered a Lucas taking
after many years of unsuccessful attempts at approvals to improve and develop
its property.30o The Beyer court found that the points assigned to the property
under the City's Residential Rate of Growth Ordinance had a value of
$15o,ooo and constituted "reasonable economic use of the property" and that
this value, coupled with the recreational uses permitted on the property, left
the owners with economically beneficial use.302
Third, in Collins v. Monroe County the property owners filed a petition for
a Beneficial Use Determination ("BUD"), which required that the property
owners prove that the land development regulations and the comprehensive
plan that were effective at the time of the BUD application deprived them of
all reasonable use of the regulated property.so3 The court found no Lucas
taking and contrasted the situation of the property owners in Collins to the
situation of the property owners in Galleon Bay.go4 The Collins court stated that
the property owners in Galleon Bay spent hundreds of thousands of dollars
pursuing reasonable investment-backed expectations and trying to develop
the property. 05 In contrast, the property owners in Collins were passive and
297. Id. at 1026-27.
298. See generally Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 105 So. 3 d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012).
299. Beyer v. City of Marathon, 197 So. 3d 563, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
3oo. Id. at 565 (discussing the Beyers' complaint which alleged a deprivation "of all or
substantially all reasonable economic use of the property by virtue of the changes in land use
regulations over the years").
301. Id. at 5 66.
302. Id. at 5 6 5 .
303. Collins v. Monroe County, 118 So. 3d 872, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
304. Id. at 876.
305. Id. at 876 n.7.
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did not invest much into the improvement or development of the regulated
property other than their initial cost of purchase.o6
In sum, the Collins property owners could not take advantage of the
Galleon Bay precedent because they failed to explore the development options
of their land that were available to them in a meaningful way prior to the
regulatory impact.07 Without having made substantial efforts to explore their
property's development potential over the decades of their ownership and in
light of the fact that building permits were available to them under the
regulatory framework, the Collins court found that the facts of the Galleon Bay
case starkly contrasted the facts in Collins.vo8
In the fourth and fifth cases, the property owners in Loewenstein v. City of
Lafayetteo9 and Allegretti & Co. v. County oflmperiallo unsuccessfully attempted
to bring their cases within the precedent of Ali v. City ofLos Angeles,1" in which
the court held that a "delay in demolition caused by the erroneous
enforcement of [a single room occupancy] ordinance despite the
prohibitions of the Ellis Act . .. temporarily deprived [the property owner] of
all use of his property and ... was a temporary regulatory taking."312 The
Loewenstein court distinguished its facts from those of Ali when it held that a
two-year delay before denying a lot-line-adjust application did not constitute
a taking.s'3 The Loewenstein court noted that, unlike in Ali, the City did not
violate a state law in denying the application and the resolution of the
application was a normal delay in the land use permitting process.314 Similarly,
the court in Allegretti held that the County's restrictions on the property
owner's ground water use did not constitute a Lucas taking and the case was
not comparable to the Ali facts because the County's actions were "not
objectively unreasonable" unlike Ali in which the court found the City's
actions violated state law.3'5
In summary, the properties in the successful Lucas cases were mostly
owned in fee simple absolute and were zoned in the least inclusive zoning
classifications-ones higher up the zoning pyramid.3' 6 The Lucas takings
issues arose when governments enforced zoning ordinances and denied
owners' requests for development approval or some other land use
3o6. Id. at 876 & n.7.
307. Id. at 876.
3o8. Id.
309. See generally Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
310. See generally Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
311. See generally Ali v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
312. Id. at 465.
313. Loewenstein, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92-93.
314. Id. at 93.
315. Allegretti, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 139.
316. See supra Part iIA.
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concession.3'7 The Lucas takings resulted from the combination of the
properties' classification in the least intensive zones of the zoning pyramid
and governments' refusal to exercise their discretion to allow for deviations
from the as-of-right uses.31 8 Restrictive zoning policies and refusal by
governments to exercise their zoning discretion are unifying themes in these
cases.
D. DELAY THEORY
Normal delays in the permitting process are typically reviewed under the
Penn Central takings framework and often will not result in compensable
regulatory takings.s'9 But, in the four cases in this category, the courts applied
a Lucas takings framework because they involved something other than a
normal development delay. Governmental bad behavior and a close hewing
to common-law nuisance principles are unifying themes of the delay theory
cases.
In the first and second cases, People ex rel. Department of Transportation v.
Diversified Properties Co.320 and Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC v. City oflndio,32" the
courts found that unreasonable delay by the state in instituting its
condemnation proceedings deprived the property owners of all of their
development rights in commercially zoned properties, thereby rendering the
restricted properties unmarketable.22 In sum, the courts were willing to
segment the denominator, moving away from a parcel-as-a-whole approach,
when they perceived government as essentially attempting to take property
from a constitutional perspective but without the formal process of
condemnation and payment ofjust compensation.323
First, in Diversified Properties, the property owner, Diversified Properties
Co. ("DPC"), purchased more than 17 acres of land in fee simple for
commercial developments24 Prior to completing the purchase, DPC was
aware that the state had designated part of the land for a possible freeway
317. See supra Part IlI.C.
318. See supra Part III.
319. SeeTahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320-21
(2002) (rejecting a categorical rule that "the mere enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in
effect, denies a property owner all viable economic use of her property gives rise to an unqualified
constitutional obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that period" and concluding
that the Penn Central framework was the appropriate framework for analyzing the case); see also supra
Part II.D. 3 (discussing the "denominator question" found in the Penn Central framework).
320. See generally People ex rel Dep't of Transp. v. Diversified Props. Co. III, i7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
321. See generally Jefferson St. Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 155 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2015).
322. See generally id.; Diversified Props., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676.
323. See generallyjefferson St. Ventures, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 155; Diversified Props., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676.
324. Diversified Props., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678.
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right of way.325 A total of 4.5 acres were set aside to accommodate the state's
future highway plans.32 6 The court found a Lucas taking resulting from the
city's decision to block the development of the 4.5 acres until the state
finalized its highway plans.327 Affirming the trial court's ruling, the court of
appeals said that the state "sat back" while the City, through use of its
development restrictions, "bank[ed]" DPC's property "presumably so that the
State could, at a later date, condemn the subject property in an undeveloped
(and, consequently, less costly) condition."s' 8
Second, in Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio, the court found a
Lucas taking of i i acres of a 26.85-acre parcel when the City conditioned
approval of the property owner's application for development of a shopping
center upon the owner "leaving approximately one-third of [the] property
undeveloped [in order] to accommodate the reconstruction of a major
freeway interchange that was in the planning stages."329 The City could not
acquire the property at the time ofJefferson's application because it did not
have the money.sso City staff explained to Jefferson during the application
process that it would not approve development of the portion of the site
designed for the freeway interchange because if the site were later taken for
the interchange, "the City would incur additional costs" if it were developed
as opposed to undeveloped.33' Applying the reasoning of the Diversified
Properties holding, the court said that this type of "banking" of property that
was otherwise commercially viable and developable so that it could be
condemned in the future at a cheaper price constituted a de facto taking that
occurred prior to the direct condemnation and deprived the owner of the
ability to obtain any economic value from the property533
In both cases, the government's decision to "bank" a portion of the
owner's total acreage was enough for the courts to essentially treat those
banked portions as separate when applying the whole parcel analysis.3s3 So,
the Lucas taking analysis occurred in the context of the banked acreage
constituting the relevant parcel, the denominator, as the courts considered
what value remained after the regulatory impact.
325. Id.
326. People ex reL Dep't of Transp. v. Diversified Props. Co. III, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676, 679
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 682.
329. Jefferson St. Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 155, 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 162.
332. Id.at176-78.
333. See id. at 178 ("[I]n this case, it is the City that has divided the Property into discrete
segments.").
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In the last two cases, Monks v. City ofRancho Palos Verdessa4 and Brost v. City
of Santa Barbara,a35 the courts hewed closely to common-law nuisance
principles in finding Lucas takings where governments imposed building
moratoria that prohibited construction on residentially zoned property under
the rationale that the properties were unstable because they were located in
landslide areas.
In the first case, Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, the court found a
Lucas taking where the government imposed a construction moratorium on
16 vacant lots located near where landslides had recently occurred.ss 6 The
properties were zoned for residential use, utilities including a sewer system
had been installed, and the court agreed with the trial court that, at best, there
was remaining uncertainty about the area's stability.337 Finally, the court
found that the intended use of the vacant lots to build homes was not a
common-law nuisance. According to the court, common-law nuisance
principles rarely support prohibiting uses of land that are "essential."33 8 After
engaging in a lengthy discussion of the government's nuisance argument, the
court concluded that given the differing and, at times, conflicting views
offered in the various reports and expert witness testimonies, it could not
reach a definitive finding on the stability and safety factor.339 Absent such a
definitive finding, the government failed to meet its burden of proof under
Lucas and under state nuisance law.34o
Finally, the California Court of Appeals in Brost v. City of Santa Barbara
affirmed the lower trial court's finding of a Lucas taking when the City of Santa
Barbara refused to amend Chapter 22-90 of its municipal code, permanently
enjoining the plaintiffs from rebuilding their homes after being destroyed by
the 2oo8 Tea Fire.341 Chapter 22.90 permanently enjoined construction on
land that was located entirely within Slide Mass C, an active landslide area.342
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of a Lucas taking and
rejected the state-law nuisance defense raised by the government.343 In doing
so, the court of appeals said that the City's argument that the plaintiffs'
development of their lots would cause significant harm to property or persons
was undercut by the fact that owners of existing homes were allowed to remain
334. See generally Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 75 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
335. See generally Brost v. City of Santa Barbara, No. B2 4 61 5 3, 2015 WL 1361196 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 21, 2015)-
336. Monks, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3 d at 8o.
337. Id. at 98.
338. Id. at 107-08.
339. Id. at io.
340. Id. at sio.
341. Brost v. City of Santa Barbara, No. B2 4 61 5 3 , 2015 WL 1361196, at *8-g (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 21, 2015). Plaintiffs' lots were zoned for residential purposes. Id.
342. Id. at *8.
343. Id. at *12.
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in their homes and to repair damage to those homes caused by earth
movement.344
One reading of Monks and Brost is that courts will insist on concrete
evidence of actual harm and not merely speculative evidence of possible harm
before they would apply the Lucas nuisance defense. Absent this type of
concrete evidence, courts will be unwilling to find that building homes on
residentially zoned property was a common-law nuisance.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Having identified the successful Lucas cases and their foundational
underpinnings, we consider Lucas's implications for the future and why Lucas
matters. First, we discuss the jurisprudential implications of Lucas, focusing
on lessons learned from our empirical study. Then we turn to Lucas's practical
implications-how the case has transformed land use transactions between
governments and property owners and the case's continuing influence on
land use litigation.
A. JURISPRUDENTiAL IMPLICATIONS
As we think about the winning Lucas cases in terms of prospective unique
lessons, many of them are special circumstances cases in which an intervening
act or situation enabled the successful Lucas takings claim. To be clear, there
is no indication that these changes in circumstances or other limitations in
ownership, operation, and use were strategic by the property owners for the
purpose of improving the odds of a Lucas claim. And, in fact, the federal court
in Lost Tree recently expressed doubt about the plausibility and likelihood that
property owners would find strategies to manipulate the denominator and
improve the likelihood of a Lucas taking.345 The court agreed with Lost Tree's
assertion "that '[i] n the real world, real estate investors do not commit capital
either to undevelopable property or to long, drawn-out, expensive and
uncertain takings lawsuits."'34 6
Famously, the United States Claims Court stated in Ciampitti v. United
States that:
The effect of a taking can obviously be disguised if the property at
issue is too broadly defined. Conversely, a taking can appear to
emerge if the property is viewed too narrowly. The effort should be
to identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possible, given the
entire factual and regulatory environment.347
344. Id.at*io-11.
345. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3 d I II, 11 18 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
346. Id.
347. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 31o, 318-19 (1991).
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So, the federal courts have been clear that intentional efforts by property
owners to manipulate their denominators are not to be countenanced.34
First, when it comes to the nuisance abatement cases, we can conclude
that despite the apprehension about statutory nuisances that can be read into
the Lucas majority opinion,349 subsequent courts and scholars seem to have
accepted that the decision is not limited to common-law nuisances.35o The
state courts' discussions of these statutory nuisance abatement cases, in the
successful Lucas challenges, emphasize the breadth of the application of the
nuisance statute (the extent to which non-nuisance activities are also
prohibited) and the bona fides of the property owners.35' The more the
abatement statutes prohibited legal uses and the greater the bona fides of the
owners, the more likely courts were to find the nuisance defense inapplicable
to the Lucas takings claim.352 Still, these nuisance abatement and Lucas
exception cases are likely outliers and hold little precedential value because
of the Supreme Court's temporary takings jurisprudence that developed
subsequent to the nuisance abatement cases.
Second, the private agreements and denominator case winners were able
to shrink or limit the denominators in their takings fraction-sometimes
through sheer luck, sometimes through sound business and development
models, sometimes because of government fiat-so that the numerator and
denominator were equal.sss While the role of private agreements in
establishing the relevant denominator in the Lucas takings equation is
unsettled in the state and federal courts,354 what is clear is that the
denominator matters and courts have been willing to honor private property
owners' restrictions on their property interests when ascertaining the
denominator for Lucas takings purposes.
We suggest that Lucas has become the Higgs boson55 of takings law as it
applies to the denominator issue. We know it exists and has had a discernable
348. Id.
349. See supra Part II.A.
350. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 331-33 (2005);
see supra Part III.A.
351. See supra Part III.A.
352. See supra Part I.A.
353. See supra Part IIIB; infta Appendix.
354. See Dwight H. Merriam, Rulesfor the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAw. L. REV. 353, 385 (2003);
supra Part IH.B.
355. Adam Mann, Higgs Boson Gets Nobel Prize, But Physicists Still Don't Know What It Means,
WIRED (Oct. 8, 2013, 3 :5 4 PM), http://www.wired.com/2o13/o/higgs-nobel-physics.
More than a year ago, scientists found the Higgs boson. This morning, two physicists
who 50 years ago theorized the existence of this particle, which is responsible for
conferring mass to all other known particles in the universe, got the Nobel, the
highest prize in science.
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impact on judicial decision-making and perhaps more importantly, on
strategies employed by landowners and developers; however, we still struggle
to understand all that lies behind the decision. What seems somehow
embedded in these successful private agreements and denominator Lucas
cases are intentional or unintentional actions by property owners or accidents
of ownership, laws and public regulation, that made the denominator in the
takings fraction smaller and, in so doing, enabled courts to find a categorical
Lucas taking. The most recent example is Love Terminal Partners, in which the
federal court expressly accounted for the use limitations in the privately
negotiated master lease in the first instance when determining the
denominator and undertaking the Lucas takings analysis and then
secondarily, in the just compensation analysis.356
Third, the pyramidal segmentation and public law impact winners'
success can be attributed to two factors. The properties in this category were
zoned in some of the least intensive use classifications on the Euclidean
zoning pyramid, and government decision-makers refused to reasonably
exercise their zoning and planning discretion to simultaneously protect the
integrity of the community and neighboring lands while also leaving property
owners with more than a pittance of value.357 These cases give life to Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,358 which
serves as a useful framework for understanding these successful Lucas cases.
In his Penn Centraldissent,Justice Rehnquist conceptualizes regulatory takings
in terms of nonconsensual servitudes.359 He cites earlier Supreme Court
precedent that in the non-noxious use setting "[p]roperty is taken in the
constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to an
extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired."6o The
burden is unique to the property owner and not offset by similar burdens, the
so-called average reciprocities of advantage, placed upon a broad group of
similar properties.3 6 '
Finally, for the delay theory winners, government error in exercising its
eminent domain powers or in meeting its burden of proof on the nuisance
defense made the Lucas claims.3 62 Bad faith on the part of government in
delaying the exercise of its power of eminent domain is a hallmark of the cases
For all the excitement the award has already generated, finding the Higgs-arguably
the most important discovery in more than a generation-has left physicists without
a clear roadmap of where to go next.
Id.
356. See generally Love Terminal Partners v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 389 (2016).
357. See supra Part III.C; infta Appendix.
358. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
359. Id. at 143 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
360. Id. at 146 (quoting United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947)).
361. Id. at 14 6-47.
362. See supra Part III.D.
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in this category as well. The lesson to be learned from the delay theory cases
is that failures in government decision-making can be the immediate
precipitant of the Lucas taking. These cases are factually unique and the
property owners' Lucas successes can be attributed almost entirely to failures
in decision-making by government.3 63
Twenty-five years after the Lucas decision, articulating the denominator
remains fact-intensive, uncertain, and variable. And, as long as the answer to
the denominator question remains the key to measuring economic impact,
the Lucas decision retains a centrality in takings jurisprudence that is perhaps
unexpected if measured solely by the scarcity of successful Lucas challenges.
Lucas incentivizes a struggle over the denominator question because the
upside for property owners is significant: if the property owner wins, the
property owner gets out from under the murky balancing test of Penn Central.
And for this reason, the denominator question that Lucas pushes to the
forefront makes the Lucas case important for not only the Lucas takings
question but for Penn Central as well because economic impact is a central
question under both tests.
B. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 2o,
2017, in Murr v. Wisconsin, a regulatory takings case that shines a spotlight on
the parcel-as-a-whole rule and the relevant-parcel question.3 64 The issue
before the Court is whether contiguous parcels under common ownership
should be treated as a single parcel for regulatory takings analysis, as was
addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Lost
Tree.3 65 No one knows how much or how little guidance the Court will provide
on this critical question. One knowledgeable commentator believes, based on
what he heard at oral argument, there is a chance the Court will come up with
a multifactor test.366 Regardless, Murr v. Wisconsin may impact the future
viability of the Lucas claim and of government liability for regulatory takings
more generally, for the reasons discussed in this Article.
As discussed above, we are perhaps standing in the forefront of a
changing landscape-a shift in theorizing about how to construct the
denominator in the takings equation. An implication of the changing
landscape is that property owners may be more willing to try to make the Lucas
claim than if they just considered the numbers. This is as opposed to seeing
the Lucas claim as a type of second-class legal theory with little chance of
363. See supra Part III.
364. See generally Murr v. State, No. 201 3 AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2014), review denied, 366 Wis.2d 59 (Wis. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 89o (2016).
365. Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214 (U.S. argued Mar. 20, 2017).
366. lya Somin, Thoughts on the Oral Argument in Murr v. Wisconsin, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpostcom/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2017/03/20/thoughts-on-the-oral-argument-in-murr-v-wisconsin/utm term=.e 1 ac037 1 ddab.
18go [VOI. 102:1847
MAKING OR BREAKING THE TAKINGS CLAIM
success that is thrown into the takings mix after the Penn Central analysis has
been thoroughly developed. The real news is that the Lucas winners and losers
indicate that property owners retain an almost surprising amount of control
in protecting their property rights, in ways we may not have expected. The
most interesting part is the extent to which courts truly are open to legitimate
efforts to protect those property rights. The Lucas losers and winners
highlight two essential takeaways for practitioners.
First, establishing the regulated parcel as a separate economic unit from
the larger property owners' holdings is critical to a winning Lucas strategy.
Every plaintiffs attorney is trying desperately to get out from under the Penn
Centralanalysis, or at least ought to be, because of the unpredictability of Penn
Central's ad hoc approach and because property owners are at a dramatic
disadvantage under Penn Central367 While property owners rarely win on their
Lucas challenges, the benefit of successfully articulating the Lucas categorical
claim is that once an owner gets within the four corners of Lucas, as small a
landscape as it is, the only question is how much compensation must be paid.
For litigators, their lives will be made easier and they will appreciate every bit
of what transactional attorneys do in the acquisition and development of real
property to assist in.making a winning case for reducing the denominator.
Litigators need to frame their claims in ways that couch the denominator in
the ways we described in this Article. Nevertheless, all litigators are limited by
the facts presented to them. For example, the choice of what to acquire-fee
simple or only leasehold; surface and subsurface estates; or only mineral
estates-will go a long way toward making or breaking the litigator's Lucas
claim.
Second and relatedly, courts are willing to consider private ordering in
constituting the denominator as long as the ordering is predicated upon what
the courts believe to be a legitimate factual basis.3 68 Owners need to have
rationally treated the regulated parcel as a separate economic interest from
the owners' larger holdings. This suggests that compartmentalization or
separation of one's development plans and strategies may make sense from
the start. In other words, it is never too early to think about protecting
property interests from regulatory takings. The key to solving the mystery of
the successful Lucas claim is to look behind the denominator to find the
common denominator, and that may be the public or private law structuring
that facilitates or even mandates segmentation. In an area where the law is so
unclear, owners have a chance of winning by seriously making the Lucas
takings claim because it is not clear that they should lose.
367. F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc
Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
121, 141-44 (2003).
368. See supra Part III.B.
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Earlier in this Article, we discussed the many ambiguities that abound in
Lucas's wake.369 Analysis of the winning Lucas cases reveals that the property
owners in those cases frequently won because they were able to play to these
lingering ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding the Lucas rule, the
exceptions to the rule, and the denominator question. In these Lucas winners,
perhaps we see, albeit modestly, some "efforts to rehabilitate the Takings
Clause as a limit on government action in the teeth of an unbroken line of
cases upholding state land use regulation."37o What is interesting is how the
law has evolved in the 25 years since Lucas was decided and without much
guidance from the Lucas Court. Even though Lucas set out a categorical rule,
the rule is so fact-intensive that the gravitational pull is back toward the Penn
Central weighing. What does this say about the law? It says that the law is
resistant to a categorical rule. It is just as resistant to a compensable taking
post-Lucas as it was pre-Lucas.
V. CONCLUSION
The answer to why Lucas matters given so few Lucas successes lies in
Lucas's contribution to the denominator question. Many thought the
denominator question was resolved when the Supreme Court first articulated
the parcel-as-a-whole rule in Penn Central but the question was clearly not
resolved as courts and property owners alike continue to think about and
litigate around the proper resolution of the denominator in the regulatory
takings equation.
Lucas's impact is understated if one focuses exclusively on the successful
Lucas cases, which are few, because most takings cases proceed under the Penn
Central analysis.s37 Even as the Lucas Court announced the categorical takings
rule, it predicted that the categorical rule would apply in "relatively rare
situations"372 and only under the most "extraordinary circumstance [s]."373
Our review of all of the reported regulatory takings cases affirm that
prediction.
Successful Lucas challenges often have involved special circumstances in
which an intervening act or event sets up the Lucas taking by reducing the
denominator in the takings equation, offering a new perspective on these
"extraordinary circumstances." We contend Lucas's significance is in its
impact on how best to resolve the denominator issue for both Lucas and Penn
Central cases. A favorable resolution of the denominator issue is the loadstar
for every regulatory takings claim brought under Lucas or Penn Central, which
will capture the majority of regulatory takings challenges. In the end, only by
369. See supra Part II.C.
370. Epstein, supra note 201, at 956.
371. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2015) (Sotomayor,J., dissenting).
372. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, lo18 (1992).
373. Id. at 1017.
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understanding how Lucas works in practice, and why, can we understand what
the true significance of Lucas really is-a matter of importance for theory and
practice alike.
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Appendix
Successful Lucas Cases
The Nuisance Abatement Cases, The Lucas Exception
City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P-3 d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 8ol So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001); two consolidated
cases; only one was found to be a Lucas taking.
State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 1998).
Private Agreements and the Denominator
Love Terminal Partners v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 389, 440 (2016),
appeal docketed, No. 16-2276 (Fed. Cir.Jun. 30, 2016).
Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994).
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3 d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
abrogated by Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3 d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 2002).
Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of Tehuacana, 369 F-3 d 882 (5 th Cir. 2004).
Ala. Dep't of Transp. v. Land Energy, Ltd., 886 So. 2d 787.(Ala. 2004).
Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 669 S.E.2d 286
(N.C. 2oo8).
Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 707 F. 3 d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
affd, 787 F.3 d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Pyramidal Segmentation and Public Law Impact
State ex rel. Greenacres Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 56 N.E. 3 d 335 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2015).
City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3 d 34 (Tex. App. 2oo8).
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3 d 1422
(9 th Cir. 1996), affd, 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
Dunlap v. City of Nooksack, No. 63747-9-1, 2ol WL 4159286 (Wash. Ct.
App. Oct. 25, 2010).
Moroney v. Mayor of Old Tappan, 633 A.2d 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993).
Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 105 So. 3 d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012).
Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996).
Lopes v. City of Peabody, No. 139663, 19 9 5 WL 17215782 (Mass. Land
Ct. March 31, 1995).
United States v. Hardage, No. 93-6ogg, 1993 WL 207380 (ioth Cir.June
9, 1993)-
Heapy v. State, No. o3-4 5 4 07-AA, 2004 WL 5573602 (Mich. Cir. Ct. April
28, 2004).
Ali v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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Delay Theory
People ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Diversified Props. Co. III, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d
676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)-
Jefferson St. Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 155 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2015).
Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 75 (Cal. Ct. App.
2oo8).
Brost v. City of Santa Barbara, No. B2 4 61 5 3 , 2015 WL 1361196 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 21, 2015)-
